Traditional models of belief formation in repeated games assume adaptive players who do not take strategic interactions into account. We find that these approaches are limited in the sense that people think more strategically and realize that, in contrast with the classical view, their own...

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among boundedly rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponents' beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end and forego immedi- ate payoffs if the...

This paper studies the role of strategic teaching in coordination games and whether changing the incentives of players to teach leads to more efficient coordination. We ran experiments where subjects played one of four coordination games in constant pairings, where the incentives to teach were...

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end ; and forego immediate payoffs if the...

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end ; and forego immediate payoffs if the...

In this article, we use data from the European Community Household Panel to evaluate the impact of a French guaranteed income program, the RMI, on the hazard out of unemployment. Self-selection into the program is corrected using a multivariate duration model developed by [Abbring, J.H., van den...