The panel structure of the Survey on Smoking in Canada (1994-95) and novel methods are used to estimate the impact of an important decrease in the levels of taxation of cigarettes occurring in five out of the ten Canadian provinces that intended to eradicate black market sales of cigarettes in...

Many studies have attempted to investigate the determinants and implications of competition in the banking industry. The literature on the measurement of competition can be divided between the structural and non-structural approaches. The structural approach infers the degree of competition from...

One answers to an open question of Herings et al. (2008), by proving that their fixed point theorem for discontinuous functions works for mappings defined on convex compact subset of $\R^n$, and not only polytopes. This fixed point theorem can be applied to the problem of Nash equilibrium...

In recent years, there has been a rising concern about the policy of major search engines, and more specifically about their ranking in so-called organic results corresponding to keywords searches. The associated proposition is that their behavior should be regulated. The concern comes from...

We deal with the problem of outsourcing the debt for a big investment, according two situations: either the firm outsources both the investment (and the associated debt) and the exploitation to a private consortium, or the firm supports the debt and the investment but outsources the...

One answers to an open question of Herings et al. (2008), by proving that their fixed point theorem for discontinuous functions works for mappings defined on convex compact subset of a Euclidean space, and not only polytopes. This rests on a fixed point result of Toussaint

Answering to an open question of Herings et al. (see [3]), one extends their fixed point theorem to mappings defined on convex compact subset of Rn, and not only polytopes. Such extension is important in non-cooperative game theory, where typical strategy sets are convex and compact. An...

We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open...

We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with separable metric strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such metric game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension G is payoff secure. We also establish that if...