characterized by uncertainty about quality (experience good) and heterogeneous piracy costs. Users can purchase or get unauthorized …/illegal copies (digital piracy) of the software during two periods (or not adopt at all). Between these two periods, users can … monitoring of piracy. We show that the software publisher can profit from accommodation a certain level of piracy of the product …

piracy on the cultural industry. The diversity of data collected and methodologies used by empirical studies make it … piracy which may be due, for example, to the use of Internet access as a proxy for piracy. On the other hand, the problem of … an underestimation of the impact of piracy. As a result, the major finding of empirical works about piracy could be the …

characterized by uncertainty about quality (experience good) and heterogeneous piracy costs. Users can purchase or get unauthorized …/illegal copies (digital piracy) of the software during two periods (or not adopt at all). Between these two periods, users can … monitoring of piracy. We show that the software publisher can profit from accommodation a certain level of piracy of the product …

grand coalition is a known result. Finally, we study collusion in auctions as a mechanism design problem, insisting on the …

and public signals. We show that competition leads the two firms to invest too early and analyze collusion schemes whereby … one firm prevents the other firm from entering the market. We show that, in the efficient collusion scheme, the active …

the seller has no way to deter collusion, he can still accomodate it optimally with a very simple mechanism, either having … mechanism, so that it enables a fair amount of competition if the seller made a mistake and the buyers don't collude. We find …

We present a Cournot model that compares the critical threshold of collusion in Duopoly and Oligopoly Markets where the … actors are private, mixed or public. We assume that the incentive critical threshold for collusion depends on the … values is consistent with our theoretical results. Our findings can be used by the decision makers to control collusion, by …

decrease with collusion, and the ex-ante surplus increases with the amount of information revealed in equilibrium. This is … competition between fewer, but more aggressive bidders, which entails more allocative efficiency and a decrease in the total …