modelled as a multiple criteria auction, and an auctioneer (a government employee) who has discretion in devising the selection … auction into a symmetric information auction (in bribes) for a common value prize. In a repeated setting we show that … implementation problems for a cartel of bidders that operates in a stochastically changing environment. A most simple allocation rule …

This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is … auction designers, competition authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed …

distinct contexts. First, for any real "allocation" matrix f. Second, for any integer constrained "apportionment" matrix f. In …

We consider a second price auction between bidders with independently and identically distributed valuations, where a … ring rather than participating in the grand cartel? We show that in the presence of direct externalities between bidders …

identity independent price externalities while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity dependent … price externalities a ect the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, the second-price auction exacerbates the eff …We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the …

In this paper we prove an index formula for production economies with externalities. We allow for non-convexities in …

In this paper, we extend the problem of decentralization of Pareto optima in an economy with production externalities …

In this paper, we introduce input-specific externalities in a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous …