We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The...

Se miden las ganancias potenciales de eficiencia de cinco fusiones de bancos, producidas entre 2005 y 2011, analizándolas con la metodología de análisis envolvente de datos. Dadas las divergencias entre modelos de rendimientos constantes y variables, se testean rendimientos para discernir...

After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance...

In this paper, we study the optimal number of active firms in acoalition and in a merger. We consider two kinds of game : a merger gameand a coalition game, both in the context of price competition with horizontalproduct differentiation. These are two-stage games. The first stage consistsof...

This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price competition with horizontal product differentiation. In contrast to the results obtained by Kamien and Zang (1990), we show that merged equilibria can appear in this game. Moreover monopolization of the industry occurs with a...

After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance...

This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two part tariffs. We show that call externalities create private incentives for each competitor to...