In this paper, we first give a direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies with consumption sets which are (possibly) unbounded below. The key assumption is that the individually rational utility set is compact. It is worth noticing that the statement of this...

Building upon recent work of Gintis, we study evolutionary dynamics in an economy with Leontieff preferences and corner endowments for which the equilibrium is completely indeterminate. We exhibit a class of dynamics which selects, via stochastic stability, the equilibrium minimizing the...

We present a mathematical model for the analysis of the bargaining games based on private prices used by Gintis to simulate the dynamics of prices in exchange economies, see [Gintis 2007]. We then characterize, in the Scarf economy, a class of dynamics for which the Walrasian equilibrium is the...

In two recent contributions, Herbert Gintis introduces agent-based imitation models built upon evolutionary bargaining games where agents use private prices as strategies. He reports surprising convergence results for simulations performed in exchange economies where goods are strict complement....

On démontre la stabilité de l'équilibre dans une économie walrasienne complètement décentralisée dans laquelle les prix sont fixés par les agents économiques et où échange et production ont lieu hors équilibre.