In this paper, we expose the results of a voting experiment realised in 2007, during the French Presidential election … selection of a Condorcet-winner. Building on our electoral sample's preferences, we show that this voting procedure can design a …

A l'occasion du premier tour des élections présidentielles du 22 avril 2012, les électeurs de trois communes françaises …

elections through the Tullock's approach based on the Contest Success Function. We obtain an ambiguous theoretical effect of …

We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the … worse - with synchronized elections, i.e. simultaneous central and regional office terms, or with staggered elections, i ….e. terms of office that do not coincide. We find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level …

A spatial model of coalition formation is used together with data from Dutch elections and theoretical instances to …

A spatial model of coalition formation is used together with data from Dutch elections and theoretical instances to …

We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the … worse - with synchronized elections, i.e. simultaneous central and regional office terms, or with staggered elections, i ….e. terms of office that do not coincide. We find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level …

We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the … worse - with synchronized elections, i.e. simultaneous central and regional office terms, or with staggered elections, i ….e. terms of office that do not coincide. We find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level …