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Granier, Laurent; Trinquard, Sébastien - HAL - 2012

In 2009, Sanofi-Aventis, whose generic subsidiary is Winthrop, merges with the generic firm, Zentiva. This paper fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning mergers in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their market share, some brand-name firms produce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791109

Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation

Joffily, Matteus; Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles; … - HAL - 2011

punishment in a social dilemma. Emotional reaction to free-riding incites individuals to apply sanctions when they are available …. The application of sanctions activates a "virtuous emotional circle" that accompanies cooperation. Emotionally aroused …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008876967

Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles; Tucker, Steven; … - HAL - 2003

group's overall welfare (James S. Coleman, 1990). Norms require enforcement with a system of sanctions that penalize … deviations from acceptable behavior (George C. Homans, 1961). Formal sanctions include fines or restrictions implemented by a … legal system or private individuals that impose costs of money and time on the offender. However, informal sanctions such as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647584

Threat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments

Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2010

Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short-run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790708

LE CONTROLE INSTITUTIONNEL DE L'INFORMATION COMPTABLE ET FINANCIERE

Djama, Constant - HAL - 2010

prenante ou en cas d'appel des décisions de l'AMF. Dans ce dernier cas, les juges confirment majoritairement les sanctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790884

Emerging sacred values: The Iranian nuclear program.

Dehghani, Morteza; Iliev, Rumen; Atran, Scott; Ginges, … - HAL - 2009

Sacred values are different from secular values in that they are often associated with violations of the cost-benefit logic of rational choice models. Previous work on sacred values has been largely limited to religious or territorial conflicts deeply embedded in historical contexts. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793317

Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game

Dai, Zhixin; Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2014

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899359

Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population

Choné, Philippe; Gauthier, Stéphane - HAL - 2014

A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025717

Random monitoring in financing relationships

Sami, Hind - HAL - 2009

This paper examines a financier's optimal monitoring intensity in a multi-period financing relationship.We identify conditions under which the financier should sometimes misidentify the quality of an entrepreneur. Such an imperfect evaluation technology affects action choices by bad...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791498

Collective penalties and inducement of self-reporting

Millock, Katrin; Zilberman, David - HAL - 2006

Random accidents can be contained by collective penalties. These penalties are not likely to be enforced but rather induce self-reporting that enhances welfare due to early containment. Self-reporting under collective penalties increases overall welfare, but may increase expected environmental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750705