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Towards an Understanding of the Phases of Goodwill Accounting in Four Western Capitalist Countries: From Stakeholder Model to Shareholder Model
Ding, Yuan; Richard, Jacques; Stolowy, Hervé - HAL - 2008
The objective of this paper is to illustrate that the change in shareholders' attitude towards firms (from stakeholder model to shareholder model) influences the accounting treatments of goodwill. Our study is based on four countries (Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and France) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009151311
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Tailoring Bank Capital Regulation for Tail Risk
Klimenko, Nataliya - HAL - 2013
The experience of the 2007-09 financial crisis has showed that the bank capital regulation in place was inadequate to … deal with "manufacturing" tail risk in the financial sector. This paper proposes an incentive-based design of bank capital … regulation aimed at efficiently dealing with tail risk engendered by bank top managers. It has two specific features: (i) first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933816
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Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision: Combining Random Audits and Continuous Intervention
Belhaj, Mohamed; Klimenko, Nataliya - HAL - 2012
costs, through a gradual adjustment of supervision effort to the bank's financial health. We also consider preventive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933829
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Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Trannoy, Alain - HAL - 2014
We characterize the set of second-best optimal "menus" of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines student loans with an elementary optimal income-tax problem. The second-best optima...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933842
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - HAL - 2012
This paper studies the optimal unemployment insurance for older workers in a repeated principal-agent model, where the search intensity of risk-averse workers (the agents) is not observed by the risk-neutral insurance agency (the principal). When unemployment benefits are the only available...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647516
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - HAL - 2011
At the end of working life, as well as reducing unemployment benefits, the unemployment-insurance agency could apply pension tax instead of wage tax. First, the pension tax provides greater incentives as the value of re-employment is tax-free. Second, the short job duration before retirement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750991
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On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
Attar, Andrea; Chassagnon, Arnold - HAL - 2006
We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751017
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Regular moral hazard economies
Chassagnon, Arnold - HAL - 2007
That paper formalizes the idea that when the magnitude of the moral hazard phenomenon is not important, the distortions like equilibria multiplicity or equilibrium discontinuity relative to the economic fundamentals disappear. We study a two state of nature insurance model, with a risk neutral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738744
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Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance
Gardiol, Lucien; Geoffard, Pierre-Yves; Grandchamp, Chantal - HAL - 2005
This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60 000 adult...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738866
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Sharing aggregate risks under moral hazard
Demange, Gabrielle - HAL - 2008
This paper analyzes the efficient design of insurance schemes in the presence of aggregate shocks and moral hazard. The population is divided into groups, the labour force in different sectors for instance. In each group, individuals are ex ante identical but are subject to idiosyncratic shocks....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738915