Similar Search Results

Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment

Masclet, David; Denant-Boèmont, Laurent; Noussair, Charles - HAL - 2006

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social … third parties, and punish low contributors, even when punishment is costly to the sanctioner. When there are five rounds of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794884

Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles; Tucker, Steven; … - HAL - 2003

A demand for behavioral norms arises when members of a group have individual incentives to take actions that reduce the group's overall welfare (James S. Coleman, 1990). Norms require enforcement with a system of sanctions that penalize deviations from acceptable behavior (George C. Homans,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647584

Threat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments

Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2010

punishment, so that they increase overall welfare ? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to … their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is … punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790708

A simple theory of the optimal number of immigrants

Chao, Chi-Chur; Hazari, Bharat R.; Laffargue, Jean-Pierre - HAL - 2008

This paper develops a simple model to explain two stylised facts about immigration. First, some countries have a low ratio of migrants in their population, while other wealthy countries have a high number of migrants. In fact such migrants are of the same order of magnitude as their domestic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930197

Bayesian repeated games and reputation

Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - HAL - 2014

The folk theorem characterizes the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium payoffs of an undiscounted or discounted infinitely repeated game - with fully informed, patient players - as the feasible individually rational payoffs of the one-shot game. To which extent does the result still hold when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746981

AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION

Melnik, Katia; Zimmermann, Jean-Benoît - HAL - 2008

We develop an economic model of association based on voluntary contributions. Different equilibria corresponding to the different modes of formation of associations are analyzed and the results are compared with existing empirical literature. The main contribution consists in formalizing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793444

Does Contributing Sequentially Increase the Level of Cooperation in Public Goods Games ? An Experimental Investigation

Masclet, David; Willinger, Marc - HAL - 2005

We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pure public good. Our design differs from the standard public good game with respect to the decision procedure. Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793492

Population Heterogeneity and the Nonprofit Sector in the United States : Global versus Local Spatial Approaches

Lebreton, Marie; Melnik, Katia - HAL - 2006

In this paper we study the relationship between the relative size of the U.S. nonprofit sector and population heterogeneity, at the county level, by adopting and extending the model of Alesina, Baquir and Easterly (1999). The relative size of the voluntary sector is assessed as a share of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794302

An Economic Approach to Voluntary Association

Melnik, Ekaterina; Zimmermann, Jean-Benoît - HAL - 2010

We develop an economic model of association based on voluntary contributions. Different equilibria corresponding to the different modes of formation of associations are analyzed and the results are compared with the existing empirical literature. The main contribution consists in analyzing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794348

Sharing the cost of a public good under nonnegativity constraints

Fleurbaey, Marc; Sprumont, Yves - HAL - 2006

We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from the others.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794864

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