Similar Search Results

Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles; Tucker, Steven; … - HAL - 2001

opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. The punishment is costly for … both the players distributing and those receiving the punishment. Like Fehr and Gaechter, we find that agents often engage … in non-credible costly punishment behavior in order to reduce earnings of others who contribute low amounts to the public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791705

Mixing the Carrots with the Sticks : Third Party Punishment and Reward

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Mitchell, Helen - HAL - 2014

laboratory studies, the demand for punishment and reward are studied separately from one another. This paper presents the results … from an experiment measuring the demand for reward and punishment by 'unaffected' third parties, separately and jointly. We … find that the demand for costly punishment is substantially lower when individuals are also given the ability to reward …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899324

Coordination in Teams : A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment

Vranceanu, Radu; Ouardighi, Fouad El; Dubart, Delphine - HAL - 2013

This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010820828

Punishment, inequality, and welfare : a public good experiment

Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2008

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates the relationships between inequality and punishment …. In particular, we analyze how inter-personal comparisons affect altruistic punishment behavior. In addition, we examine … how punishment affects inequality over time. We compare two treatments of a two-stage public good game, one in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791276

Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment

Masclet, David; Denant-Boèmont, Laurent; Noussair, Charles - HAL - 2006

third parties, and punish low contributors, even when punishment is costly to the sanctioner. When there are five rounds of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794884

Edgeworth and Lindahl-Foley equilibria of a general equilibrium model with private provision of pure public goods

Florenzano, Monique; Mercato, Elena L. Del - HAL - 2006

In this paper, we propose a definition of Edgeworth equilibrium for a private ownership production economy with (possibly infinitely) many private goods and a finite number of pure public goods. We show that Edgeworth equilibria exist whatever be the dimension of the private goods space, and can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750403

Bargaining over public goods

Davila, Julio; Eeckhout, Jan; Martinelli, César - HAL - 2008

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750409

General equilibrium

Florenzano, Monique - HAL - 2007

Unlike partial equilibrium analysis which study the equilibrium of a particular market under the clause "ceteris paribus" that revenues and prices on the other markets stay approximately unaffected, the ambition of a general equilibrium model is to analyze the simultaneous equilibrium in all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750449

Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004

Andre, Pierre; Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine - HAL - 2010

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753932

Taking the Well-being of Future Generations Seriously : Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods?

Grolleau, Gilles; Sutan, Angela; Vranceanu, Radu - HAL - 2013

We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898453