Similar Search Results

Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility in Bargaining : Evidence from a Transcontinental Ultimatum Game

Boarini, Romina; Laslier, Jean-François; Robin, Stéphane - HAL - 2009

This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. The bargaining took the form of standard ultimatum games, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects and, in another treatment, French subjects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791480

Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility in Bargaining: Evidence from a Transcontinental Ultimatum Game

Boarini, Romina; Laslier, Jean-Francois; Robin, Stéphane - HAL - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794757

Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game

Boarini, Romina; Laslier, Jean-François; Robin, Stéphane - HAL - 2009

This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects (ItoF treatment) and, in another treatment, French subjects made...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839517

Moral Hypocrisy, Power and Social Preferences

Rustichini, Aldo; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2012

the fairness and unfairness of allocations in three different scenarios (a Dictator game, an Ultimatum game, and a Trust … same session we elicit again their principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in the same three … norm in its favor and the weak side agrees : Stated fairness is a compromise with power. Second, in most situations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899809

The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information

Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - HAL - 2012

Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547613

The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information

Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - HAL - 2012

Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899150

Comparing Inequality Aversion across Countries When Labor Supply Responses Differ

Bargain, Olivier; Dolls, Mathias; Neumann, Dirk; … - HAL - 2013

We analyze to which extent social inequality aversion differs across nations when control ling for actual country differences in labor supply responses. Towards this aim, we estimate labor supply elasticities at both extensive and intensive margins for 17 EU countries and the US. Using the same...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933830

Efficiency and behavioral considerations in labor negotiations

Königstein, Manfred; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2010

Experimental literature has shown that social preferences influence how individuals bargain and make sharing decisions. It usually considers situations in which individuals negotiate on a single issue. This paper explores a different environment and reports on an experiment based on a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647578

Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent ?

Giraud, Gaël; Renouard, Cécile - HAL - 2010

Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social positions in society. In this paper, we provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010549107

Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent ?

Giraud, Gaël; Renouard, Cécile - HAL - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605310