the semipublic firm is smaller than that of the private firm. The more the semipublic firm is concerned for social welfare …

grand coalition is a known result. Finally, we study collusion in auctions as a mechanism design problem, insisting on the …

and public signals. We show that competition leads the two firms to invest too early and analyze collusion schemes whereby … one firm prevents the other firm from entering the market. We show that, in the efficient collusion scheme, the active …

room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason … decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the …

favoritism substantially facilitates collusion. It increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic …), favoritism only partially shades the cartel from the environment. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at … and collusion in public markets. It also shows that the rotation of officials is not one of them. …

This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is …) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bidding can facilitate collusion. We also find that … with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions where firms are small relative to the market. Our main message to …

collusion between policyholders and insurance agents or service providers. …

Nous présentons dans ce papier une modélisation du seuil critique de préférence pour la collusion dans un duopole mixte …'objectif consiste à comparer la préférence pour la collusion à travers ce seuil dans les deux structures de marché étudiées et dans deux …