This paper analyses the effect of transitory increases in government spending when public debt is used as liquidity by the private sector. Aggregate shocks are introduced into an incomplete-market economy where heterogenous, infinitely-lived households face occasionally binding borrowing...

This paper analyses the effects of money shocks on macroeconomic aggregates in a flexible-price, incomplete-markets environment that generates persistent wealth inequalities amongst agents. In this framework, unexpected money shocks redistribute wealth from the cash-rich employed to the...

This paper develops a simple business-cycle model in which financial shocks have large macroeconomic effects when private agents are gradually learning their uncertain environment. When agents update their beliefs about the parameters that govern the unobserved process driving financial shocks...

It has long been argued in the history of economic thought that over investment through highly leveraged borrowing under elastic credit supply may generate large boom-bust business cycles. This paper rationalizes this idea in a dynamic general equilibrium model with infinitely lived rational...

This article develops a vertical differentiation model to study the competition and environmental effects of multiplicity of eco-labels within a given market. The focus is on the informational content of multiple eco-labels and whether or not they reflect the environmental qualities the labels...

We study how asymmetric information affects the set of rationalizable solutions in a linear setup where the outcome is determined by forecasts about this same outcome. The unique rational expectations equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable solution when the sensitivity of the outcome to...

This paper applies to adverse selection theory the advances made in the field of ambiguity theory. It shows that i) a relevant second-best contract induces no production distortion considering the efficient agent as in the standard case. But the principal has to pay a higher information rent...

Our earlier papers had extend to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common observation suggests,...

Our earlier papers had extended to asymmetric information some classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew at the outset which price would prevail tomorrow on each spot market. Yet, observation...

In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially "arbitrage state(s)", namely, the state (s) which would grant the agent an...