We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occuring out of equilibrium.

Within a standard framework à la Arrow-Debreu, we investigate the dynamics emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous households and firms that are adaptive price setters and financially constrained. We show that depending on the stringency of the financial constraints the model can settle...

We present a mathematical model for the analysis of the bargaining games based on private prices used by Gintis to simulate the dynamics of prices in exchange economies, see [Gintis 2007]. We then characterize, in the Scarf economy, a class of dynamics for which the Walrasian equilibrium is the...

On démontre la stabilité de l'équilibre dans une économie walrasienne complètement décentralisée dans laquelle les prix sont fixés par les agents économiques et où échange et production ont lieu hors équilibre.

Within a standard framework à la Arrow-Debreu, we investigate the dynamics emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous households and firms that are adaptive price setters and financially constrained. We show that depending on the stringency of the financial constraints the model can settle...

This paper focuses on the influence on the general equilibrium of an economy of the opening of markets of allowances, such as the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Assuming there existed an equilibrium before the opening of allowances' markets, we describe the changes in the firms behavior...

This paper studies the welfare improvement properties of a market of allowances in an economy with a single type of externality. We show that thanks to the opening of such a market the Pareto optima can be decentralized as marginal pricing equilibria. However, the set of equilibria is much...

We prove that the degree of the equilibrium correspondence of an economy with increasing returns and external effects is equal to (−1)L−1 where L is the dimension of the space of goods. This allows us to infer existence, finiteness and uniqueness results.

In two recent contributions, Herbert Gintis introduces agent-based imitation models built upon evolutionary bargaining games where agents use private prices as strategies. He reports surprising convergence results for simulations performed in exchange economies where goods are strict complement....

In this paper we prove an index formula for production economies with externalities. We allow for non-convexities in the production sector and set the firms behavior according to general pricing rules. We derive as corollaries existence of a general equilibrium in such a setting.