The aim of this paper is to explore the characteristics of the optimal nonlinear labor income tax in dynamic economies with information asymmetries and human capital accumulation. We develop a dynamic optimal income tax model in which agent's productivity evolves over time according to two...

This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two...

This paper analyzes the relationship between public disclosure, private information and stock liquidity in Tunisian context using a sample of 41 listed firms in the Tunis Stock Exchange in 2007. First, we find no evidence that there is a relation between public and private information. Second,...

This paper addresses the question of whether public information destabilises the economy in the context of signals of different nature. We present an experimental evaluation of the speculative attack game of Morris and Shin (1998). Our objective is twofold: to evaluate whether public information...

The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally...

This paper addresses the question whether public information destabilises the economy in the context of signals of different nature. We present an experiment on the speculative attack game of Morris and Shin (1998). Our objective is double: (i) evaluating whether public information destabilises...

We study the performance of US actively managed equity mutual funds with traditional models and find, as in previous studies, that they obtain negative performance. We argue that this pessimistic result is explained by the excessively high expenses charged by managers. Managers justify these...

In this paper, we propose to compare different partial transparency regimes in order to determine the optimal diessemination policy by the central bank, using an experimental approach. A treatment dedicated to the benchmark situation (where information is fully released) is also available. Our...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because public signals are more informative about the likely behavior of others. We present an experiment in which...