In this paper, we propose a definition of Edgeworth equilibrium for a private ownership production economy with (possibly infinitely) many private goods and a finite number of pure public goods. We show that Edgeworth equilibria exist whatever be the dimension of the private goods space, and can...

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the...

Unlike partial equilibrium analysis which study the equilibrium of a particular market under the clause "ceteris paribus" that revenues and prices on the other markets stay approximately unaffected, the ambition of a general equilibrium model is to analyze the simultaneous equilibrium in all...

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results,...

We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group...

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms--the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA)--in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the...

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bar- gaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lin- dahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The pro- cedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output...

This paper provides an explanation of the emergence of the standars textbook definition of public goods in the middle of the 20th century. It focuses on Richard Musgrave's contribution in defining public goods as non-rival and non-excludable - from 1939 to 1969. Although Samuelson's mathematical...