To what extent is the observed mis-pricing in experimental asset markets caused by strategic uncertainty (SU) and by individual bounded rationality (IBR)? We address this question by comparing subjects initial price forecasts in two market environments - one with six human traders, and the other...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

This paper presents a computational macroeconomic model which closely associates Keynesian thinking and an agent-based approach. This model is original because we do not introduce any causality between macroeconomic variables. Instead of postulate macroeconomic properties, we want to understand...

We consider a purely speculative market with finite horizon and complete information. We introduce partially sophisticated investors, who know the average buy and sell strategies of other traders, but lack a precise understanding of how these strategies depend on the history of trade. In this...

We define continuous-time dynamics for exchange economies with fiat money. Traders have locally rational expectations, face a cash-in-advance constraint, and continuously adjust their short-run dominant strategy in a monetary strategic market game involving a double-auction with limit-price...

This paper applies a social learning model to the optimal consumption rule of Allen & Carroll (2001), and delivers convincing convergence dynamics towards the optimal rule. These findings constitute a significant improvement regarding previous results in the literature, both in terms of speed of...