This paper applies to adverse selection theory the advances made in the field of ambiguity theory. It shows that i) a relevant second-best contract induces no production distortion considering the efficient agent as in the standard case. But the principal has to pay a higher information rent...

In this paper, I show that Polleit and Mariano (2011) are right in concluding that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are per se unobjectionable from Rothbard's libertarian perspective on property rights and contract theory, but that they fail to derive this conclusion properly. I therefore outline the...

Based on recent data concerning the French distribution networks in retail and services, this paper highlights several stylized facts relating to the sector-based differences in the organizational choices. Until now this issue has not been studied in the economical literature. This paper...

This paper investigates the impact of family control on French acquirers' performance.We consider a sample of 239 acquisitions undertaken by French listed companies between January 1997 and December 2006. Comparing both, short-termand long-termperformance,we find that family-controlled firms...

The purpose of this study is to introduce the board of directors as a signal of firm quality to abate information asymmetry. This study is based on agency theory and signaling theory to suggest that the existence of properly structured board at the time of the IPO may signal high firm quality to...

This paper deals with contractual design and vertical relationships within a franchise chain, in the field of the literature on share contracts. Within a double-sided moral hazard, the contract sharing the profit generated by the vertical decentralized structure results from the necessity to...

This paper compares the effectiveness of strict liability and capped strict liability regimes in an agency relationship among a regulatory agency and operators of risky activities. Under a double asymmetric information assumption (wealth and efficiency in care effort), it shows that capping...

Our earlier papers had extend to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common observation suggests,...

Our earlier papers had extended to asymmetric information some classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew at the outset which price would prevail tomorrow on each spot market. Yet, observation...

In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially "arbitrage state(s)", namely, the state (s) which would grant the agent an...