A demand for behavioral norms arises when members of a group have individual incentives to take actions that reduce the group's overall welfare (James S. Coleman, 1990). Norms require enforcement with a system of sanctions that penalize deviations from acceptable behavior (George C. Homans,...

This paper reports the results of an experiment on how team composition influences both the contract offer of employers and employee performance when a revenue-sharing scheme is introduced. Experimental evidence shows that the principal ceases trying to monitor her team through a contract offer...

Many empirical studies have shed light on the efficiency of peer pressure. I propose here to model peer pressure by incorporating in the utility function self centered inequity aversion. I find that opportunity for sufficiently inequity averse players to punish their peers, is effective in...

In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. The punishment is costly for both the players distributing and those receiving the...

We study the effect of a large set of department characteristics on individual publication records. We control for many individual time-varying characteristics, individual fixed-effects and reverse causality. Department characteristics have an explanatory power that can be as high as that of...

Consumers and organisations are increasingly considering longer term sustainability issues when they purchase or supply goods or services: "green buying" appears to be gaining momentum. However, progress is slow and the percentage of green purchases has remained static at 2% for the last two...