Showing 1 - 10 of 89
the two parties and that both of them provide non-contractible efforts which diminish their incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630684
Early regulator interventions into problem banks is one of the key suggestions of Basel II. However, no guidance is given on their design. To fill this gap, we outline an incentive-based preventive supervision strategy that eliminates bad asset management in banks. Two supervision techniques are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933829
That paper formalizes the idea that when the magnitude of the moral hazard phenomenon is not important, the distortions like equilibria multiplicity or equilibrium discontinuity relative to the economic fundamentals disappear. We study a two state of nature insurance model, with a risk neutral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738744
This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60 000 adult...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738866
This paper analyzes the efficient design of insurance schemes in the presence of aggregate shocks and moral hazard. The population is divided into groups, the labour force in different sectors for instance. In each group, individuals are ex ante identical but are subject to idiosyncratic shocks....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738915
hand is twofold. (a) First the rent extracted by the most efficient bank distorts incentives of entrepreneurs to undertake … featuring a lower cyclicality of aggregate lending might not be desirable as it may come along with allocative and incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739116
pension tax instead of wage tax. First, the pension tax provides greater incentives as the value of re-employment is tax …-free. Second, the short job duration before retirement implies that the budgetary return and search incentives associated with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750991
We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751017
This paper provides an answer to the question of why agents make self-serving decisions under moral hazard and how their self-serving decisions can be kept in check through institutional arrangements. Our theoretical model predicts that the agents' power and the manner in which they are held...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025659
This paper studies the optimal unemployment insurance for older workers in a repeated principal-agent model, where the search intensity of risk-averse workers (the agents) is not observed by the risk-neutral insurance agency (the principal). When unemployment benefits are the only available...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025914