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Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities

Biran, Omer - HAL - 2011

We consider a second price auction between bidders with independently and identically distributed valuations, where a losing bidder suffers a negative direct externality. Considering ex-ante commitments to form bidding rings we study the question of core stability of the grand coalition, namely:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009211251

Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design

Florenzano, Monique - HAL - 2010

Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problems, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603927

Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs

Koessler, Frédéric; Martimort, David - HAL - 2008

This paper investigates optimal communication mechanisms with a two-dimensional policy space and no monetary transfers. Contrary to the one-dimensional setting, when a single principal controls two activities undertaken by his agent (cooperative design), the optimal communication mechanism never...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751022

College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective

Zhu, Min - HAL - 2013

This paper justifies the evolution of the college admissions system in China from a mechanism design perspective. The sequential choice algorithm and the parallel choice algorithm used in the context of China's college admissions system are formulated as the well-studied Boston mechanism and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899518

Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude

Gruyer, Nicolas - HAL - 2005

This paper studies the optimal auction for a seller who is bound to sell a single item to one of two potential buyers organized in a "well-coordinated" cartel. After discussing the way the cartel reacts to any auction mechanism, we show that if the seller has no way to deter collusion, he can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899614

From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century

Florenzano, Monique - HAL - 2009

Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738669

Optimal Extortion and Political Risk Insurance

Koessler, Frédéric; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane - HAL - 2012

We study the problem faced by firms that invest in a foreign country characterized by weak governance. Our focus is on extortion relying on the threat of expropriation and bureaucratic harassment. The bureaucrat's power is characterized by looking at a general extortion mechanism adapted from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739035

Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games

Lamy, Laurent - HAL - 2008

This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the strategic and informational details of the participation game are partially-specified. This means that full participation is required to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium for a large variety of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739083

MUTUAL INSURANCE WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: THE CASE OF ADVERSE SELECTION

Bourlès, Renaud; Henriet, Dominique - HAL - 2008

This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-sharing agreements. It displays the optimal incentive compatible sharing rule in a simple two-agent model with two levels of risk. When individual risk is public information, equal sharing of wealth is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794272

DYSFUNCTIONS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM AND THEIR EFFECTS ON COMPETITION

Encaoua, David; Madies, Thierry - HAL - 2012

exclusionary right given to an inventor to encourage innovation, and the welfare loss induced by the market power associated to … and competition on the product market, the technology market, and the innovation market. The first distortion is related … in the context of an isolated innovation, is not quite adapted to the context of sequential innovations. While sequential …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751030

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