We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence … constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under … generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of …

Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the …, one or several players with all their subordinates. In these situations, the core in its usual formulation may be … unbounded, making its use difficult in practice. We propose a new notion of core, called the restricted core, which imposes …

definition includes as a particular case the classical definition of pure exchange economy. We adapt the core concept to a … coalitional exchange economy, and we show the non-emptiness of the core. Finally, we discuss more general setting where individual …

finding the core of such games, i.e., theset of additive dominating games. …

Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the … core, reflecting the team structure, and previous attempts are not satisfactory in this respect. We propose a new notion of … core, which imposes efficiency of the allocation at each level of the hierarchy, and answers the problem of sharing …

In the classical setting of cooperative game theory, it is always assumed that all coalitions are feasible. However in … graphs. We study in this perspective the core of games defined on k-regular set systems. We show that the core may be …

-multicoalitional core and the c-multicoalitional core, and both arise as the strong Nash equilibrium of two games, where in the first … utility per active unit of time is maximized, while in the second it is the utility per total unit of time. We show that the d-core … (or aspiration core) of Benett, and the c-core of Guesnerie and Oddou are strongly related to the d-multicoalitional and c …

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality …. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of … particular, the k-additive core proposed by Grabisch and Miranda is a general solution preserving coalitional rationality which …

to the c-core, while the latter corresponds to the aspiration core or d-core, where in both case, the best configuration …, that is, coalitions for which any solution of the d-core yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worht. In … possible payment (core element) and a single possible configuration. We also introduce the notion of inescapable coalitions …