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Social Accountability: Persuasion and Debate to Contain Corruption

Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane - HAL - 2013

observation by the manager of the accountability mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751020

The success story of a ‘successful?' management device

Dreveton, Benjamin; Rocher, Sébastien - HAL - 2009

This paper deals with the implementation of a management device in a French regional government. Based on a case study, it sets out to describe the stages in the implementation of this management device, from its development by administrative staff to its initial rejection and subsequent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791520

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:

Biot-Paquerot, Guillaume; Rossignol, Jean-Luc - HAL - 2006

Education supply in universities of most European countries has for the last ten years become a strategic matter. At present, French universities consider education supply as an investment. But they do not utilize all incentive mechanisms in order to drive their strategies. At the beginning of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791696

Decomposing wage inequality: Public and private sectors in Vietnam 1993-2006

Imbert, Clément - HAL - 2011

This paper studies the labor market in Vietnam during the transition towards market economy (1993-2006): we show that the public-private sector wage gap markedly increased, but that wage inequality decreased overall. Our aim is to assess how much of this evolution can be explained by workers'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008835408

Threshold of Preference for Collusion and Interconnection Fees in Different Market Structures : the Tunisian Mobile Market Case

Debbichi, Sami; Hichri, Walid - HAL - 2013

We present a Cournot model that compares the critical threshold of collusion in Duopoly and Oligopoly Markets where the actors are private, mixed or public. We assume that the incentive critical threshold for collusion depends on the interconnection fees. The different threshold values...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899868

Trust and the Welfare State: The Twin Peaks Curve

Algan, Yann; Cahuc, Pierre; Sangnier, Marc - HAL - 2014

We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933915

Influence of the corruption on the FDI level; case of Serbia.

Bazin, Damien; Danon, Marko - HAL - 2009

In this text we will show a connection between the level of corruption and the level of the FDI entering an economy. We … understanding of the process by which the corruption transmits its effects thru the economy, in this case, on the FDI. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010936652

Measuring corruption: perception surveys or victimization surveys?

Roca, Thomas - HAL - 2011

-headed monster. Since 2003 and the first publication of Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer, researchers have …While methodologies and survey techniques recorded progress over the years, corruption measurement remains a many … access to population's feeling about the corruption scourge across institutions. Thereby, wider room emerged for populations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323507

Does the fight against corruption require international cooperation?

Faure, Pierre-Henri - HAL - 2011

This paper explores the role of corruption in a two-country model with fiscal spillovers. In the absence of cooperation … on governance issues, countries always have a strategic incentive to appoint policymakers whose aversion to corruption is … lower than average. An international agreement is a precondition for placing corruption fighters at the head of governments. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009277879

Public Debt Accumulation and Institutional Quality: Can Corruption Improve Welfare?

Faure, Pierre-Henri - HAL - 2009

We explore the consequences of bad governance and corruption for public debt and welfare in a model of policymaking … point of this paper is that corruption can enhance welfare in two ways: first, by mitigating the inflationary bias of … accumulation. The paper thus invokes the lack of interest for explaining the prevalence of corruption in countries with low …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278335