Showing 1 - 10 of 26
The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS-10 level to depict effective market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN members would receive on impact following the implementation of an FTA with the EU. First, the measures show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008805940
Building on earlier work by Estevadeordal, we construct a synthetic index (R-index)intending to capture the restrictiveness on market access due to product specific rules of origin (PSRO)that apply at the tariff-line level. The R-index is constructed for rules of origins under NAFTA and under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836504
This paper estimates the effective market-access granted under NAFTA in textiles and apparel by combining two approaches. First, we estimate the effect of tariff preferences and rules of origin on the border prices of Mexican final goods exported to the US and of US intermediates exported to Mexico.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836506
This paper sheds light on the restrictive nature of rules of origin (ROO) and on the role of diagonal cumulation in mitigating the protectionist content of ROO. Empirical evidence suggests that diagonal cumulation has beneficial effects on trade - particularly among spoke countries. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898816
It was a hope of LDCs that the DOHA round would bring them greater market access in OECD countries than for non-LDCs. Using HS-6 tariff level data for the US and the EU for 2004, this paper estimates that, once the erosion from preferential access into the EU to non-LDCs are taken into account,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794783
The classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition $N$ when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025606
The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition $N$ when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. The authors have proposed in a previous paper an allocation scheme for a general model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025642
The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025903
Time series of coalitions (so-called scenarios) are studied that describe processes of coalition formation where several players may enter or leave the current coalition at any point in (discrete) time and convergence to the grand coalition is not necessarily prescribed. Transitions from one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025940
The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive of a player to join a syndicate in an environment of team production and payoff distribution according to Shapley value. We consider an economy in which a single output is produced by an increasing returns to scale production function using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010602580