Based on the notion of equilibrium of a coalition P relatively to a coalition K, of Berge, Zhukovskii has introduced Berge equilibrium as an alternative solution to Nash equilibrium for non cooperative games in normal form. The essential advantage of this equilibrium is that it does not require...

In this paper, we give new sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution of theg-maximum equality. As an application, we prove a new fixed point theorem.

In this paper, we give new sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution of theg-maximum equality. As a consequence, we prove a new fixed point theorem. We also prove a new theorem of existence of Nash equilibrium.

In this paper, we study the main properties of the strong Berge equilibrium which is also a Pareto efficient (SBPE) and the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). We prove that any SBPE is also a SNE, we prove also existence theorem of SBPE based on the KyFan inequality. Finally, we also provide a...

In this paper, we give new sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution of theg-maximum equality. As an application, we prove a new fixed point theorem.

In this paper, we study the main properties of the strong Berge equilibrium which is also a Pareto efficient (SBPE) and the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). We prove that any SBPE is also a SNE, we prove also existence theorem of SBPE based on the KyFan inequality. Finally, we also provide a...

In this paper, we give new sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution of theg-maximum equality. As a consequence, we prove a new fixed point theorem. We also prove a new theorem of existence of Nash equilibrium.

Based on the notion of equilibrium of a coalition P relatively to a coalition K, of Berge, Zhukovskii has introduced Berge equilibrium as an alternative solution to Nash equilibrium for non cooperative games in normal form. The essential advantage of this equilibrium is that it does not require...