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Dumbing down rational players : learning and teaching in an experimental game

Terracol, Antoine; Vaksmann, Jonathan - HAL - 2007

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end ; and forego immediate payoffs if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750958

Experimental comparison of compulsory and non compulsory arbitration mechanisms

Guerci, Eric; Thoron, Sylvie - HAL - 2011

Conciliation). The two mechanisms are also compared with a negotiation without arbitration. We observe that the ROC mechanism seems …We run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme FOA (Final Offer Arbitration) with a new … arbitration scheme, non compulsory, we proposed in a companion paper (Tanimura and Thoron (2008)): ROC (Recursive Offer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008924979

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence

Gabuthy, Yannick; Marchand, Nadège - HAL - 2003

This paper presents the results of an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism … efficiency. This conclusion is consistent with the experimental results on arbitration and the well-known chilling effect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008789255

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence

Gabuthy, Yannick; Jacquemet, Nicolas; Marchand, Nadège - HAL - 2008

This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovativebargaining mechanism (called …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750512

Online Dispute Resolution and Bargaining

Gabuthy, Yannick - HAL - 2003

Automated negotiation process seems to be a powerful mechanism to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online blind-bidding process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791155

Social structure and reputation: the NASDAQ case study

Revest, Valérie; Guennif, Samira - HAL - 2005

In 1996, two investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Department of Justice reported non-competitive practices among market makers on the NASDAQ. These reports also mentioned the influence of the NASDAQ social structure on market makers' behaviours....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793027

Can Wages Signal Kindness?

Arbak, Emrah; Kranich, Laurence - HAL - 2005

We model the interaction between an employer and a worker with interdependent preferences in a simple one-shot production process. In particular, we assume that the worker becomes kinder if she senses that her employer is an altruist. We assume that intentions are private information. Thus, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793118

Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach

Maillé, Patrick; Reichl, Peter; Tuffin, Bruno - HAL - 2011

Network users can choose among different security solutions to protect their data. Those solutions are offered by competing providers, with possibly different performance and price levels. In this paper, we model the interactions among users as a noncooperative game, with a negative externality...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804712

Fusions endogènes : une revue de la littérature

Granier, Laurent - HAL - 2010

This paper analyzes the literature concerning models of endogenous mergers. Traditional models of exogenous mergers analyze mergers as isolated phenomena. However, some empirical facts about M&A don't seem to be explained in this literature. Models of endogenous mergers take into account all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008789485

Towards a theory of deception

Jehiel, Philippe; Ettinger, David - HAL - 2005

This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to deception where deception is defined to be the process by which actions are chosen to induce erroneous inferences so as to take advantage of them. Specifically, we introduce a framework with boundedly rational players in which agents make inferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738710