In an upstream supply chain dedicated to the mass production of customized products, many sources create production instability: the level and structure of production in the final assembly line, variability of lead times, quality issues, packaging and loading constraints on transportation,...

In an upstream supply chain dedicated to the mass production of customized products, many sources of production instability can be identified: the level and structure of the production of the final assembly line, the variability of lead times, the quality issues, packaging and loading...

In an upstream supply chain (USC) dedicated to the mass production of customized products, decentralized management is possible and performing in the steady state, if all the links that precede the final assembly line use periodic replenishment policies. These policies require appropriate safety...

This paper discusses the problem of optimal design of a jurisdiction structure from the view point of a welfarist social planner when households with identical utility functions for non-rival public good and private consumption have private information about their contributive capacities. It...

This paper studies selection rules i.e. the procedures committees use to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. The main ingredient of the model is that committee members are uncertain about their final preferences at the selection stage: they only know the probability that they will...

Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the...

In three related papers, we consider a pure exchange financial economy, where agents may observe private information signals, form private anticipations and face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state, and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future prices. At a sequential equilibrium,...

We introduce a two-period general equilibrium model with uncertainty and incomplete financial markets, where default is allowed and agents face in case they do default an utility penalty, which is their own private information. In this setting, if agents have heterogeneous characteristics they...

Our earlier papers [2,3,4,5,6] had extended to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory [1,7,10], under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common...