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Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Trannoy, Alain - HAL - 2014
We characterize the set of second-best optimal "menus" of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines student loans with an elementary optimal income-tax problem. The second-best optima...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933842
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Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance
Gardiol, Lucien; Geoffard, Pierre-Yves; Grandchamp, Chantal - HAL - 2005
This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60 000 adult...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738866
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Heterogeneous Banking Efficiency : Allocative Distortions and Lending Fluctuations
Duprey, Thibaut - HAL - 2013
This paper is a first attempt to connect the heterogeneity in bank efficiency with lending fluctuations and allocation … efficiency: there is a trade-off between the two in the presence of heterogeneity in bank monitoring efficiency. The mechanism at … featuring a lower cyclicality signals a lower efficiency in its monitoring abilities; (iii) a heterogeneous banking system …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739116
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Ambiguity, Agency Relationships and Adverse Selection
Mondello, Gérard - HAL - 2012
This paper applies to adverse selection theory the advances made in the field of ambiguity theory. It shows that i) a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734227
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General equilibrium with asymmetric information and default penalties
Gouveia, Nuno - HAL - 2005
We introduce a two-period general equilibrium model with uncertainty and incomplete financial markets, where default is allowed and agents face in case they do default an utility penalty, which is their own private information. In this setting, if agents have heterogeneous characteristics they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750610
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Tailoring Bank Capital Regulation for Tail Risk
Klimenko, Nataliya - HAL - 2013
The experience of the 2007-09 financial crisis has showed that the bank capital regulation in place was inadequate to deal with "manufacturing" tail risk in the financial sector. This paper proposes an incentive-based design of bank capital regulation aimed at efficiently dealing with tail risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933816
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Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision: Combining Random Audits and Continuous Intervention
Belhaj, Mohamed; Klimenko, Nataliya - HAL - 2012
Early regulator interventions into problem banks is one of the key suggestions of Basel II. However, no guidance is given on their design. To fill this gap, we outline an incentive-based preventive supervision strategy that eliminates bad asset management in banks. Two supervision techniques are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933829
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - HAL - 2012
This paper studies the optimal unemployment insurance for older workers in a repeated principal-agent model, where the search intensity of risk-averse workers (the agents) is not observed by the risk-neutral insurance agency (the principal). When unemployment benefits are the only available...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647516
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - HAL - 2011
At the end of working life, as well as reducing unemployment benefits, the unemployment-insurance agency could apply pension tax instead of wage tax. First, the pension tax provides greater incentives as the value of re-employment is tax-free. Second, the short job duration before retirement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750991
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On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
Attar, Andrea; Chassagnon, Arnold - HAL - 2006
We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751017