We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral …

This paper analyzes the efficient design of insurance schemes in the presence of aggregate shocks and moral hazard. The … identical but are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Without moral hazard, optimality requires (1) full insurance against … conflicts with the full insurance of idiosyncratic shocks. In particular, how is the sharing of macro-economic risks across …

We consider a competitive insurance market in which agents can privately enter into multicontractual insurance … relationships and undertake hidden actions. We study the existence of linear equilibria when insurance companies do not have any … types of linear equilibria could exist: A first one in which insurance companies make zero expected profits, and a second …

asymmetric information (about the state), a rule with random verification in a pre-announced subset is shown to be optimal in a …

approaches to insurance fraud that have been developped in the literature, namely the costly state verification and the costly …We survey recent developments in the economic analysis of insurance fraud. The paper first sets out the two main … state falsification. Under costly state verification, the insurer can verify claims at some cost. Claims' verification may …

-tax problem. The second-best optima provide incomplete insurance because of moral hazard; they typically involve cross … incentives and insurance (redistribution). …

This paper studies the optimal unemployment insurance for older workers in a repeated principal-agent model, where the … search intensity of risk-averse workers (the agents) is not observed by the risk-neutral insurance agency (the principal …). When unemployment benefits are the only available tool, the insurance agency is not able to induce older workers to search …

At the end of working life, as well as reducing unemployment benefits, the unemployment-insurance agency could apply …