In this paper, the authors consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay.

Ce papier s’appuie sur des théories de cognition numérique pour étudier les erreurs de rappel de prix faites par les enfants. L’objectif est, entre autre, de souligner les caractéristiques du prix qui sont sources d’erreurs et d’analyser la structure même de ces erreurs afin de...

We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, where the transition is controlled by one of the players. <p> We prove that if the informed player also controls the transition, the game has a value, whereas if the uninformed player controls the transition, the max-min value, as...</p>

We study zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of the opponent. Rather, they observe a stochastic signal that may depend on the state, and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume each player observes the state and his own action. <p> We propose a...</p>

We survey recent results on the existence of the value in zero-sum stopping games with discrete and continuous time, and on the existence of e-equilibria in non zero-sum games with discrete time.

This paper finds that the market betas of value and small stocks have decreased by about 75% in the second half of the twentieth century. The decline in beta can be related to a long-term improvement in economic conditions that made these companies less risky.