The investment procedure prescribes the stages and tests through which all investment projects must pass before being accepted or not. It governs the conditions of acceptability and constitutes a powerful device of a priori control. In this paper, we intend to understand how investment...

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The allocation of funds is subject moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive payments linked to attaining the next...

In this study we re-examine the pricing of equity and the risk incentives of shareholders in levered firms. We derive a down-and-out call equity valuation model which rests on the assumption that shareholders choose the optimal investment and asset returns' volatility as a function of current...

This paper investigates why firms choose to undertake product expansion through alliances with competitors rather than on their own.

In this paper, the authors show that a cross-listing allows a firm to make better investment decisions because it enhances stock price informativeness.

The paper suggests that military history should be subjected to modelling based on the mathematical theories of rational choice, and especially the theory of games. This suggestion primarily concerns military events that have already been reported in narratives focusing on the agents'...

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...

In this paper, the authors introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call "preopening". During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted...

In this note we study a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining procedure between two risk neutral individuals engaged in the joint stochastic production of a commodity. Each individual has to exert effort, that is, to provide a one-dimensional input which is unobserved to the other individual. The...

We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, where the transition is controlled by one of the players. <p> We prove that if the informed player also controls the transition, the game has a value, whereas if the uninformed player controls the transition, the max-min value, as...</p>