the authors develop a two-sided asymmetric information model of asset sales that incorporates the key differences from mergers and allows the information held by each party to be impounded in the transaction. Buyer information is conveyed through a first-stage competitive auction. A seller with...

In this paper, the authors introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call "preopening". During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted...

In this paper we show that long run market informational inefficiency is perfectly compatible with standard rational sequential trade models. Our inefficiency result is obtained taking into account two features of actual financial markets: tradable quantities belong to a quantity grid and...

We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We first derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence...

In this paper, the authors define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players’ continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. They characterize a set...

We show that differences in investors risk aversion can generate herd behavior in stock markets where assets are traded sequentially. This in turn prevents markets from being efficient in the sense that financial market prices do not converge to the asset's fundamental value. The informational...

This paper presents a model of trading in unique durable assets that provide idiosyncratic payoffs, such as art, luxury real estate, and firm subsidiaries. Agents make purchase and sale decisions in an auction market based on their private use value of the asset and on the expected resale...

In this paper, the authors characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs...

We analyze the implications of the decision to spawn or to retain a new product for the nature and evolution of the firm. In our model, a new product is spawned if the fit between the product and its parent firm organization is not adequate. We focus on the impact of the firm's history of...

Debt with many creditors is analyzed in a continuous-time pricing model of the levered firm in the presence of corporate taxes. We specifically allow for debtor opportunism in form of repeated strategic renegotiation offers and default threats. Dispersed creditors will only accept coupon...