This paper studies how strategic interaction between players can influence their decisions as to whether to acquire information and whether to reveal their private information to others. We show how a player can increase his utility by disclosing part of his private information, when such...

Speed matters: we show that an investor's optimal trading strategy is significantly different when he observes news faster than others versus when he does not, holding the precision of his signals constant. When the investor has fast access to news, his trades are much more sensitive to news,...

In this paper we show that long run market informational inefficiency is perfectly compatible with standard rational sequential trade models. Our inefficiency result is obtained taking into account two features of actual financial markets: tradable quantities belong to a quantity grid and...

This paper focuses on how forecasts information is disclosed in IPO prospectuses. In France, managers report either detailed forecasts or only a brief summary. We investigate the determinants and consequences of the varying levels of detail provided in these forecasts. Based on a sample of 82...

We build a dynamic model of investment and financing decisions to study the choice between bonds and bank loans in a firm's marginal financing decision and its effects on corporate investment. We show that firms with more growth options, higher bargaining power in default, operating in more...

This paper focuses on the predictability of the duration between intra-day price changes of stocks from the CAC 40, as well as on the predictability of the returns generated by these price changes. It is argued that traders with different time horizons will look at series of price changes...

In this paper, the authors test the hypothesis that individual investors contribute to the idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns because they act as noise traders.

Speculators can discover whether a signal is true or false by processing it but this takes time. Hence they face a trade-off between trading fast on a signal (i.e., before processing it), at the risk of trading on a false positive, or trading after processing the signal, at the risk that prices...

It is commonly argued that dynamic consistency, consequentialism and non-expected utility are incompatible. The first aim of this paper is to rebut such arguments, by targeting the implicit assumption that the relevant contingencies correspond to objective resolutions of uncertainty (that is,...

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...