We develop a model in which two profit maximizing exchanges compete for IPO listings. They choose the listing fees paid by firms wishing to go public and control the trading costs incurred by investors. All firms prefer lower costs, however firms differ in how they value a decrease in trading...

This paper studies how strategic interaction between players can influence their decisions as to whether to acquire information and whether to reveal their private information to others. We show how a player can increase his utility by disclosing part of his private information, when such...

This paper provides a survey of recent changes in the market microstructure of the 5 largest European Stock Exchanges. We first provide a brief statistical overview of European equity markets. Then we discuss how the introduction of the Investment Services Directive and the development of...

We consider information sharing between traders("floor brokers") who possess different types of information, namely information on the payoff of a risky security or information on the volume of liquidity trading in this security. We interpret these traders as dual -capacity brokers on the floor...

We analyze the effect of concealing limit order traders’ identities on market liquidity. We develop a model in which limit order traders have asymmetric information on the cost of limit order trading (which is determined by the exposure to informed trading). A thin limit order book signals to...

In many security markets, dealers trade with their regular clients at a discount relative to prevailing bid and ask quotes. In this article we provide an explanation to this phenomenon. We consider a dealer and an investor engaged in a long-term relationship. The dealer assigns a reputational...