The investment procedure prescribes the stages and tests through which all investment projects must pass before being accepted or not. It governs the conditions of acceptability and constitutes a powerful device of a priori control. In this paper, we intend to understand how investment...

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The allocation of funds is subject moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive payments linked to attaining the next...

This paper investigates why firms choose to undertake product expansion through alliances with competitors rather than on their own.

In this paper, the authors show that a cross-listing allows a firm to make better investment decisions because it enhances stock price informativeness.

In this study we re-examine the pricing of equity and the risk incentives of shareholders in levered firms. We derive a down-and-out call equity valuation model which rests on the assumption that shareholders choose the optimal investment and asset returns' volatility as a function of current...

The political theory of regulation holds that deregulation of utilities obliges the former monopoly to abandon its rent-seeking activities to concentrate upon economic activities. However, the arguments presented by scholars to explain this strategic transformation are not entirely convincing....

In this paper the authors explore performance measurement practices in pharmaceutical companies with particular reference to the inscribing (or ‘tracing’) of pharmaceutical representatives (‘drug reps’) responsible for the promotion of prescription medications to general practitioners...

This paper considers the impact of privatization on corporate entrepreneurship. The proposed model illustrates how a firm's capacity to implement internal changes is influenced by three factors: credibility of the privatization process, speed of the process, and the new regulatory environment....

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...

In this note we study a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining procedure between two risk neutral individuals engaged in the joint stochastic production of a commodity. Each individual has to exert effort, that is, to provide a one-dimensional input which is unobserved to the other individual. The...