We examine group-lending under sequential financing. In a model with moral hazard, social capital and endogenous group formation, we identify conditions such that sequential financing with joint liability leads to positive assortative matching between borrowers with and without social capital...

This paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of group-lending, in particular sequential financing and contingent renewal. We examine the encacy of these two schemes in harnessing social capital. We find that, for the appropriate parameter configurations, there is homogenous group-formation so that...

We develop a simple model of group-lendingbased on peer monitoring and moral hazard. We find that, in the absence of sequential financing or lender monitoring, group-lending schemes may involve under-monitoring with the borrowers investing in undesirable projects. Moreover, under certain...

The existing literature on Indian growth finds no evidence of B convergence across states. This represents a puzzle given the relatively free flows of capital, labour and commodities across state borders. We use a new data set to estimate convergence rates across 575 Indian districts and find...

The ratio of Indian to US per capita output over the past 45 years has displayed a distinctive "V"-shaped pattern. We show that a strikingly similar V-shaped pattern is visible not just in aggregate output figures, but also as the primary determinant of long-term movements in the cross-sectional...