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While vertical integration is traditionally seen as a solution to the hold-up problem, this paper highlights instead that it can generate hold-up problems — for rivals. We first consider a successive duopoly where competition among suppliers eliminates any risk of hold-up; downstreamfirms thus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010968928
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008594384
The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005767508
We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affects competition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008492570
In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon- Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008492573
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We study bundling by a dominant multi-product rm facing competition from a rival multi-product rm. Compared to competition under independent pricing, competition under pure bundling reduces (increases) each rm's prot for low (high) levels of dominance, while for intermediate levels of dominance,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898244
We show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment timing. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g. an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input, and if the supplier has market power, investment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511621
investment game, which may include preemption episodes and tacit collusion episodes. However, when firms have not yet invested in … hold capacity, tacit collusion episodes may be MPE-compatible with firms investing simultaneously at a postponed time …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008461063
This paper identifies strategies to build a library consortium from a long term point of view. Contrary to the conventional wisdom to build a consortium around groups of homogenous institutions (Davis, 2002), we find that libraries with similar preferences are likely to lose from building a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010968933