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We survey some recent results on implementation of competitive solutions in differential economies. Extending to this context Arrow and Debreu’s definitions raises many conceptual issues. For instance, some properties of rational expectations equilibria may appear as paradoxical. In order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984913
Nous passons en revue quelques résultats récents sur la concrétisation des solutions concurrentielles d'économies où les agents ne disposent pas tous de la même information. Dans ce cadre, l'extension des définitions formalisées par Arrow et Debreu suscite de nombreuses difficultés...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008505510
In a linear model of cost reducing R&D/Cournot competition, firm assymetry is shown to be sustainable as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with R&D competition only if the productivity of research is sufficiently large realtive to the benefits from imitation. In such a case, industry-wide cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984766
The paper considers a model of a federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. The regions’ choices determine the allocation of capital across the regions and their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984771
Revenue sharing can be used to discourage low tax regions from competing for capital and firms with high tax regions. However, with heterogeneous regions, revenue sharing involves net transfers across regions and creates a “moral-hazard” problem - that is, regions may want to invest less in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984781
We introduce a class of games with complementarities that has the quasisupermodular games, hence the supermodular games, as a special case. Our games retain the main property of quasisupermodular games : the Nash set is a nonemply complete lattice. We use monotonicity properties on the best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984846
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe (J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994, 299-235) to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when prayers are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement. the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985022
We study a sequential bargaining game with a deadline from which the size of the cake decays. Two bargaining procedures are considered: a model with alternating-offers and a model with iterated simultaneous demands. We show that the bargaining game with alternating-offers has a unique SPE...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985036
We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The novelty is that we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device, where each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985105
Many acts of sacrifice cannot be accounted for as instances of sophisticated selfishness, altruism, Kantian duty, or collusion of the powerful. Economists find these acts puzzling and seek to accomodate them within standard instrumental models of increasing complexity. The paper argues in favor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985127