Nous passons en revue quelques résultats récents sur la concrétisation des solutions concurrentielles d'économies où les agents ne disposent pas tous de la même information. Dans ce cadre, l'extension des définitions formalisées par Arrow et Debreu suscite de nombreuses difficultés...

We survey some recent results on implementation of competitive solutions in differential economies. Extending to this context Arrow and Debreu’s definitions raises many conceptual issues. For instance, some properties of rational expectations equilibria may appear as paradoxical. In order to...

Until now most research in dynamic games focus on models with quadratic objective functions because of practical considerations. But in reality, all problems are not quadratic. In this paper, we solve a differential game where players have non-quadratic preferences. In particular we consider an...

Under the Cross-Licensing system (CL), firms are allowed to trade non cooperatively the results of R&D efforts, and compete in the innovation and production stages. First, the paper proposes a simple modeling of this system. Second, a relevant comparison is made with the Cartelized Research...

We develop a game-theoretic model of doping which focuses on the economic aspects of competitive sports. According to the model, incentives for athletes to use doping increase when (i) the efficiency of the drug test system is low, (ii) the number of competitions during one season is high, (iii)...

Cet article étend l’analyse des jeux stratégiques de marché au modèle à générations imbriquées? Nous considérons une économie avec un bien et de la monnaie de crédit où les stratégies des agents sont du type “achat ou vente”. Nous montrons que l’existence d’un équilibre...

In a linear model of cost reducing R&D/Cournot competition, firm assymetry is shown to be sustainable as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with R&D competition only if the productivity of research is sufficiently large realtive to the benefits from imitation. In such a case, industry-wide cost...

The paper considers a model of a federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. The regions’ choices determine the allocation of capital across the regions and their...

Revenue sharing can be used to discourage low tax regions from competing for capital and firms with high tax regions. However, with heterogeneous regions, revenue sharing involves net transfers across regions and creates a “moral-hazard” problem - that is, regions may want to invest less in...

We introduce a class of games with complementarities that has the quasisupermodular games, hence the supermodular games, as a special case. Our games retain the main property of quasisupermodular games : the Nash set is a nonemply complete lattice. We use monotonicity properties on the best...