We develop a methodology to sign output distortions in the random participation framework. We apply our method to monopoly nonlinear pricing problem, to the regulatory monopoly problem and mainly to the optimal income tax problem. In the latter framework, individuals are heterogeneous across two...

We derive a general optimal income tax formula when individuals respond along both the intensive and extensive margins and when income effects can prevail. Individuals are heterogeneous across two dimensions: their skill and their disutility of participation. Preferences over consumption and...

This paper studies the impact of low-skilled immigration on the host country’s education system, which is characterized by sources of school funding, expenditres per pupil, and types of parents who are more likely to send children to publicly (privately) funded schools. When the size of...

This paper studies the impact of low-skilled immigration on the host country’s education policy, which is formulated by the natives via voting and refers to both school funding sources and resources in the public funded schools. When the size of low-skilled immigrants is large, it is found...

This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analyzing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selecion effects, and thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economics of scale, so...

Empirical papers show that labor income and capital income are differently taxed all over the world. We investigate whether this may correspond to individual preferences. We tackle this question in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents: young versus old...

In most democracies, the majority of education expenditures is financed by the government. In non-democracies, we observe a wide variation in the mix of public and private funding of education. In addition, countries with high inequality tend to rely more heavily on private schooling. We develop...

We model how a Beveridgean pay-as-you-go pension system may be supported by a majority of heterogeneous voters in a general equilibrium OLG model. The introduction of heterogeneity creates intragenerational transfers among workers which may lead to different optimal taxation rates within young...

This paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization of th net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a public good : immigrants could...

Nous étudions dans un modèle à générations imbriquées le rôle primordial du gouvernement pour la pérennité des systèmes de retraite par répartition. Nous montrons que les systèmes de retraite à fort taux de cotisation, comme ceux que l'on observe en Europe, ne sont viables à long...