For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus...

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A model is presented where two market makers with two different information partitions compete in prices. At each stage a bid-ask auction between...

Nous analysons le problème de la formation d'une entente entre soumissionnaires à un appel d'offres au premier prix confrontés au risque d'être détecté. Considérant qu'une entente peut être détectée dès qu'un offreur est dénoncé, notre objectif est de déterminer l'influence de ce...

In this paper, we design the optimal procurement mechanisms when bidders are privately informed on efficiency and on observable but neither verifiable nor contractible quality. We show that most of the optimal procurement institutions are mixed procedure implying both separation and pooling....

Cet article étudie les marchés publics à tranches. Ces procédures sont caractérisées par la présence d'une incertitude sur la réalisation complète d'une opération. Celle-ci est alors découpée en plusieurs travaux (tranches) qui doivent être réalisés successivement. La première...

We study an auction mechanism combining the war of attrition and the all-pay auction under the assumption that buyers' signals are affiliated. We provide a sufficient condition which guarantees the existence of a symmetric, increasing equilibrium bidding strategy, but rules out full extraction...

We study information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We focus on the one sided case and perform a dynamic analysis of a constant entry flow model. The same question has been studied in an identical framework in Serrano and Yosha (1993) but they limit their analysis to the...

We study how asymmetric information impinge on oligopolistic firms’ decision between direct investment and exports in a game-theoretic model with Bayesian learning. Host firms have superior information about market demand and foreign firms can improve their knowledge if foreign direct...

We study the efficiency of the equilibrium price in a centralized, order-driven market where many asymmetrically informed traders are active for many periods. We show that asymmetries of information can lead to sub-optimal information revelation with respect to the symmetric case. In particular,...

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict with matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets : a set of matchings is a von...