Showing 1 - 10 of 19
The German Corporate Governance Code works according to the comply-or-explain principle. One of its recommendations was to publish the remuneration of the members of the executive board on an individual basis. We examine the characteristics of the firms that comply with the code requirement. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008683749
This paper investigates politically connected firms in Germany. With the introduction of a new transparency law in 2007, information on additional income sources for all members of the German parliament became publicly available. We find that members of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957230
In the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, it is common practice for chief executive officers (CEOs) to become the chairman of the supervisory board of the same company upon retirement. As members of the supervisory board, they are involved in setting the pay for their successors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957242
In the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, it is not uncommon for chief executive officers (CEOs) to become the chairman of the supervisory board of the same company upon retirement. This practice has been discussed controversially because of potential conflicts of interest. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957243
This paper studies the impact of counter-party default risk of forward contracts on a firm's production and hedging decisions. Using a model of a risk-averse competitive firm under price uncertainty, it derives several fundamental results. If expected profits from forward contracts are zero, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008683755
Until October 2004 corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares of their firm 'without delay'. In practice substantial reporting delays were common. We show that the delays are systematically related to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684968
In the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era corporate insiders were required to report trades in shares of their firm until the 10th of the month following the trade. This gave them considerable flexibility to time their trades and reports strategically, e.g., by executing a sequence of trades and reporting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684985
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957190
This paper studies the hedging of price risk when payment dates are uncertain, a problem that frequently occurs in practice. It derives and establishes the variance minimizing dynamic hedging strategy, using forward contracts with different times to maturity. The resulting strategy fully hedges...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957194
We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance of S&P 500 (S&P 1500) firms from 1994-2005 (1996-2005). We find that firms in which the CEO holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by up to 16% p.a. after controlling for traditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957233