We prove that every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Given a TU game, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced cover of the given game. Therefore, a Walrasian...

We consider fundamental questions of arbitrage pricing arising when the uncertainty model incorporates volatility uncertainty. The resulting ambiguity motivates a new principle of preference-free valuation. By establishing a microeconomic foundation of sublinear price systems, the principle of...

We study a continuous-time problem of public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent aims to maximize his expected utility allocating his initial wealth over a given time period between private consumption and repeated but irreversible...

The present paper considers a class of general equilibrium economics when the primitive uncertainty model features uncertainty about continuous-time volatility. This requires a set of mutually singular priors, which do not share the same null sets. For this setting we introduce an appropriate...

This paper establishes, in the setting of Brownian information, a general equilibrium existence result in a heterogeneous agent economy. The existence is generic among income distributions. Agents differ moreover in their stochastic differential formulation of intertemporal recursive utility....

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any...

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and...