Similar Search Results

Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution under Uncertainty

Ferrari, Giorgio; Steg, Jan-Henrik; Riedel, Frank - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2015

We study a continuous-time problem of public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent aims to maximize his expected utility allocating his initial wealth over a given time period between private consumption and repeated but irreversible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164360

Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games

Riedel, Frank; Steg, Jan-Henrik - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

one for discrete-time games. Many timing games in continuous time have only equilibria in mixed strategies - in particular … equilibria of that literature, which has been lacking as we show. We obtain a general constructive existence result for subgame …-perfect equilibria in preemption games and illustrate our findings by several explicit applications. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929863

Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games

Sass, Linda - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2013

Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098621

Coordination with independent private values: Why pedestrians sometimes bump into each other

Kuzmics, Christoph - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

always equilibria of this game. Some such games, however, also have other (pure strategy) equilibria with a positive … likelihood of mis-coordination. Perhaps surprisingly, in some such games, these Pareto-inefficient equilibria, with a positive … likelihood of mis-coordination, are the only evolutionarily stable equilibria of the game. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098627

Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics

Balkenborg, Dieter; Hofbauer, Josef; Kuzmics, Christoph - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2011

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195601

The Continuous Logit Dynamic and Price Dispersion

Lahkar, Ratul; Riedel, Frank - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

equilibria in negative definite games. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897080

Efficiency Based Measures of Inequality

Andonie, Costel; Kuzmics, Christoph; Rogers, Brian W. - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

How should we make value judgments about wealth inequality? Harsanyi (1953) proposes to take an individual who evaluates her well-being by expected utility and ask her to evaluate the wealth possibilities ex-ante (i.e. before she finds her place in society, i.e., under the "veil of ignorance" of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945121

Persistent ideologies in an evolutionary setting

Koch, Lars P. - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2008

We analyse finite two player games in which agents maximize given arbitrary private payoffs which we call ideologies. We define an equilibrium concept and prove existence. Based on this setup, a monotone evolutionary dynamic governs the distribution of ideologies within the population. For any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002288

Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

Jäger, Gerhard; Koch-Metzger, Lars; Riedel, Frank - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2009

convex categories. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game by representing these … longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528579

Ambiguity in a Real Option Game

Hellmann, Tobias; Thijssen, Jacco - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2015

In this paper we study a two-player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be ambiguous with maxmin preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126750