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An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2009

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining … games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S, d) an extensive form …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543232

Top responsiveness and stable partitions in coalition formation games

Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2005

Top responsiveness is introduced by Alcalde and Revilla [Journal of Mathematical Economics 40 (2004) 869-887] as a property which induces a rich domain on playerss preferences in hedonic games, and guarantees the existence of core stable partitions. We strengthen this observation by proving the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687756

Efficiency Based Measures of Inequality

Andonie, Costel; Kuzmics, Christoph; Rogers, Brian W. - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

How should we make value judgments about wealth inequality? Harsanyi (1953) proposes to take an individual who evaluates her well-being by expected utility and ask her to evaluate the wealth possibilities ex-ante (i.e. before she finds her place in society, i.e., under the "veil of ignorance" of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945121

Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

Jäger, Gerhard; Koch-Metzger, Lars; Riedel, Frank - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2009

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528579

Persistent ideologies in an evolutionary setting

Koch, Lars P. - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2008

We analyse finite two player games in which agents maximize given arbitrary private payoffs which we call ideologies. We define an equilibrium concept and prove existence. Based on this setup, a monotone evolutionary dynamic governs the distribution of ideologies within the population. For any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002288

Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics

Balkenborg, Dieter; Hofbauer, Josef; Kuzmics, Christoph - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2011

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195601

Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games

Sass, Linda - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2013

Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098621

Coordination with independent private values: Why pedestrians sometimes bump into each other

Kuzmics, Christoph - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098627

The Continuous Logit Dynamic and Price Dispersion

Lahkar, Ratul; Riedel, Frank - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

We define the logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy spaces and establish its fundamental properties, i.e. the existence, uniqueness and continuity of solutions. We apply the dynamic to the analysis of the Burdett and Judd (1983) model of price dispersion. Our objective is to assess...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897080

Strategic Formation of Homogeneous Bargaining Networks

Gauer, Florian - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … sequential network bargaining. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete characterization of networks being pairwise (Nash … bargaining outcomes to be substantially narrowed down provided pairwise stability. Further, we find that for sufficiently high …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011100260