We develop a continuous-time real options pricing model to study managers’incentives to cheat in the presence of equity-based compensation policies.We show that managers’ incentives to cheat are strongly influenced by theefficiency of the justice. Our model’s main result is that managers...

When information is costly, a seller may wish to prevent prospective buyers from acquiring information, for the cost of information acquisition is ultimately borne by the seller. A seller can achieve the desired prevention of information acquisition through posted-price selling, by offering...

Valuing early-stage high-technology growth-oriented companies is a challenge to current valuation methodologies. Efforts are redirected towards the design of investment contracts which materially skew the distribution of payoffs in favor of the venture investors. In effect, limitations in...

A common method of valuing the equity in leveraged transactions is the flows-to-equity method whereby the free cash flow available to equity holders is discounted at the cost of equity. This method uses a standard definition of equity free cash flow, but the cost of equity varies over time as...

In this paper, we use a unique hand-collected dataset to analyze stock listing as an entrepreneurial decision. By comparing mainland Chinese entrepreneurial firmslisted in Hong Kong with the same type of firms opting for a domestic listing on the Shenzhen second board market, we argue that the...

Using a new data set of small public firms in Germany, this paper analyzes the incentive and entrenchmenteffects associated witrh mangerial equity owernership. The relationship between firm value and insider ownership is found to be nonlinear: at low levels of ownership firm value is positive...

This paper tests two competing hypotheses about the influence of financial institutions as large shareholders on the performance of their industrial portfolio firms: the superior monitoring hypothesis versus the rent extraction hypothesis. The methodology of this study exploits the abolishment...

Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately-held firms, such as joint ventures or venture capital-backed firms. We provide an explanation for the use of put and call options, tag-along rights, drag-along rights, demand rights, piggy-back rights, and catch-up...

We examine merger activity and its effect on asset pricing in a firm network economy. Mergers create internal capital markets which change the cash flow risk structure of the merging firms. We propose a solution concept for coalitional games without the superadditivity axiom, which extends...

This paper analyzes the independence of boards of directors as an optimally chosen, non-contractible behavior. A board behaves loyally to a CEO when it agrees to a negative NPV-pro ject, giving the CEO private benefits. While the CEO benefitsfrom competent directors because they help him make...