Seit einigen Jahren wird in Deutschland über Veränderungen in der Finanzierungund im Leistungskatalog des Krankenversicherungssystems intensiv diskutiert. Dabeiwerden häufig problematische Anreizstrukturen im Hinblick auf das Verhaltender Versicherten genannt. Insbesondere haben Versicherte...

One of the main features of health insurance is moral hazard, as defined by Pauly (1968); people face incentives for excess utilization of medical care since they do not pay the full marginal cost for provision. To mitigate the moral hazard problem, a coinsurance can be included in the insurance...

This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components of Sweden's social insurance system. There are two main topics of interest: how the sickness report rate and the length of the subsequent...

This paper estimates the effects of early interventions in the Swedish sickness insurance system. The aim of the interventions is to screen and, further to, rehabilitate sick listed individuals. We find that the early interventions – in contrast to what is expected – increase the inflow into...