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Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627997

Fairness, Errors and the Power of Competition

Fischbacher, Urs; Fong, Christina M.; Fehr, Ernst - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

One of the most basic questions in economics concerns the effects of competition on market prices. We show that the neglect of both fairness concerns and decision errors prevents a satisfactory understanding of how competition affects prices. We conducted experiments which demonstrate that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463516

Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods

Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2005

We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit individuals’ cooperation … novel test as to whether there are "types" of players who behave consistently with their elicited preferences. We find clear …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585644

Measuring Social Norms and Preferences using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists

Camerer, Colin F.; Fehr, Ernst - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

Experimental games turned out to be remarkably productive tools for examining the nature of social preferences and social norms. This paper describes the methods and tools of experimental game theory and provides a selection of games that have been useful. We also discuss the role of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585655

Coordination in a Repeated Stochastic Game with Imperfect Monitoring

Gerber, Anke; Hens, Thorsten; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection arguments either have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627914

The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers Bargaining between Inequity-Averse Agents

Ewerhart, Christian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

The paper analyzes the infinite-horizon alternating-offers bargaining game between agents with inequity … affect the ex-post bargaining outcome, giving an advantage to the party that contributed more. Under suitable circumstances …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627959

Market experience is a reference point in judgments of fairness

Herz, Holger; Taubinsky, Dmitry - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2013

-applicable model of path-dependent fairness preferences, in which past experiences shape preferences, and we experimentally test the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817279

Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition

Schmidt, Klaus M.; Bartling, Björn - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604136

Stochastic Utility Theorem

Blavatskyy, Pavlo R. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2007

This paper analyzes individual decision making under risk. It is assumed that an individual does not have a preference relation on the set of risky lotteries. Instead, an individual possesses a probability measure that captures the likelihood of one lottery being chosen over the other. Choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463515

Living in Two Neighborhoods - Social Interactions in the Lab

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

Field evidence suggests that agents belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. Testing for such effects raises severe identification problems. We conduct an experiment that avoids these problems. The main design feature is that each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463522