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Kushnir, Alexey - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010

market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642479

A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005184889

Choice Democracy

Ledoit, Olivier - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2011

Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358880

Local contraction-stability and uniqueness

Hefti, Andreas M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2013

This paper investigates the relationship between uniqueness of Nash equilibria and local stability with respect to the …, local stability and uniqueness are the same formal properties of the game. With equilibrium substitutes, local stability is … equilibria of symmetric games more stable. Finally, the relationship between the stability of the Nash best-response dynamics is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817285

On uniqueness and stability of symmetric equilibria in differentiable symmetric games

Hefti, Andreas - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2011

between stability and (in)existence of multiple symmetric equilibria. While there is an equivalence between stability … relationship breaks down in higher dimensions. Stability under symmetric adjustments is a minimum requirement of a symmetric …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643463

Training Intensity and First Labor Market Outcomes of Apprenticeship Graduates

Euwals, Rob; Winkelmann, Rainer - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2003

The apprenticeship system is the most important source of formal post-secondary training in Germany. Using German register data - the IAB Employment Sample - we find that apprentices staying with their training firm after graduation have longer first-job durations but not higher wages than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756636

Academic rankings and research governance

Osterloh, Margit; Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010

Academic rankings today are the backbone of research governance, which seem to fit the aims of “new public management” on the one side and the idea of the “republic of science” on the other side. Nevertheless rankings recently came under scrutiny. We discuss advantages and disadvantages...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008548321

Should I stay or should I go? An institutional approach to brain drain

Cassar, Lea; Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010

This paper suggests that institutional factors which reward social networks at the expenses of productivity can play an important role in explaining brain drain. The effects of social networks on brain drain are analyzed in a decision theory framework with asymmetric information. We distinguish...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493959

Attraction and cooperative behavior

Darai, Donja; Grätz, Silvia - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

Being good-looking seems to generate substantial benefits in many social interactions, making the "beauty premium" a not to be underrated economic factor. This paper investigates how physical attractiveness enables people to generate these benefits in the case of cooperation, using field data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817274

The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation

Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220298