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Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types
Ewerhart, Christian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817244
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Auctioning risk: The all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
Klose, Bettina; Schweinzer, Paul - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012
We analyse the all-pay auction with incomplete information and variance-averse bidders. We characterise the symmetric equilibrium for general distributions of valuations and any number of bidders. Variance aversion is a sufficient assumption to predict that high-valuation bidders increase their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817294
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On the economics and biology of trust
Fehr, Ernst - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009
In recent years, many social scientists have claimed that trust plays an important role in economic and social transactions. Despite its proposed importance, the measurement and the definition of trust seem to be not fully settled, and the identification of the exact role of trust in economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463530
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More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding
Bohnet, Iris; Frey, Bruno S.; Huck, Steffen - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More law," it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. This paper studies a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585611
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Choice Democracy
Ledoit, Olivier - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2011
Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358880
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Local contraction-stability and uniqueness
Hefti, Andreas M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2013
This paper investigates the relationship between uniqueness of Nash equilibria and local stability with respect to the …, local stability and uniqueness are the same formal properties of the game. With equilibrium substitutes, local stability is … equilibria of symmetric games more stable. Finally, the relationship between the stability of the Nash best-response dynamics is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817285
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On uniqueness and stability of symmetric equilibria in differentiable symmetric games
Hefti, Andreas - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2011
between stability and (in)existence of multiple symmetric equilibria. While there is an equivalence between stability … relationship breaks down in higher dimensions. Stability under symmetric adjustments is a minimum requirement of a symmetric …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643463
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A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games
Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005184889
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Verantwortliches Handeln - Gestalten von Ordnung
Falkinger, Josef - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012
Das Geschehen auf den Finanzmärkten hängt vom individuellen Verhalten ab, wird aber auch wesentlich bestimmt durch die Ausgestaltung des Finanzsystems, das heisst durch die Rollen, die den einzelnen Akteure zugewiesen werden, und durch die Regeln für die Interaktion der verschiedenen Rollen....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817281
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Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue
Osterloh, Margit; Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
Corporate scandals are reflected in excessive top management compensation and fraudulent accounts. These scandals cause an enormous amount of damage, not only to the companies affected, but also to the market economy as a whole. As a solution, conventional wisdom suggests more monitoring and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760916